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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
IN AND FOR KING COUNTY

BARBARA R. SINGER; and JASON F.
LYONS

Plaintiffs,

vs.

BIOMET, INC.; BIOMET ORTHOPEDICS,
LLC; BIOMET U.S. RECONSTRUCTION,
LLC; BIOMET MANUFACTURING, LLC;
ZIMMER BIOMET HOLDINGS, INC;
NORTHWEST BIOMET, INC.; JAMES
REIFF, II; JOHN CUCKLER, M.D.; and
ALABAMA MEDICAL CONSULTANTS,
INC.;

Defendants.

NO. 19-2-15517-5

COMPLAINT FOR PERSONAL INJURY

COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs, BARBARA R. SINGER and JASON F. LYONS, (“Plaintiffs”), bring suit against Defendants; BIOMET, INC.; BIOMET ORTHOPEDICS, LLC; BIOMET U.S. RECONSTRUCTION, LLC; BIOMET MANUFACTURING, LLC; AND ZIMMER BIOMET HOLDINGS, INC (hereafter collectively referred to as “Biomet”); NORTHWEST BIOMET, INC. and JAMES REIFF, II (hereafter collectively referred to as “Distributor”); and JOHN CUCKLER, M.D. and ALABAMA MEDICAL CONSULTANTS, INC. (hereafter collectively referred to as “Cuckler”), and states as follows:

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PARTIES, VENUE AND JURISDICTION

1
2 1. This is a lawsuit regarding a defective metal on metal hip replacement system
3 implanted in Plaintiffs which was designed, developed, manufactured, labelled, promoted,
4 marketed, sold, and supplied by Defendants.

5 2. The particular hip replacement system at issue in this case is the “Biomet M2a
6 Metal on Metal Hip Replacement” which includes both the Biomet M2a-38 and the Biomet
7 M2a-Magnum (hereafter referred to as the “M2a”).

8 3. Plaintiffs were each implanted with the Biomet M2a metal on metal hip
9 replacement in the State of Washington.

10 4. At all times relevant to this Complaint, Defendant BIOMET, INC, was and is an
11 Indiana-based multinational corporation, with its corporate headquarters in Warsaw, Indiana
12 and facilities world-wide. Further, at all times relevant to this Complaint, Defendants
13 BIOMET ORTHOPEDICS, LLC; BIOMET U.S. RECONSTRUCTION, LLC; and BIOMET
14 MANUFACTURING, LLC each are and have been wholly owned subsidiaries of Defendant
15 BIOMET, INC. In June of 2015, BIOMET, INC, was purchased by ZIMMER BIOMET
16 HOLDINGS, INC, also having its world-wide corporate headquarters in Warsaw, Indiana.
17 From June of 2015 to present, all activities relating to the product at issue in this case were
18 directed and controlled by ZIMMER BIOMET HOLDINGS, INC. Hereafter, these
19 defendants are referred to collectively as “Biomet Defendants” or simply “Biomet.”
20

21 5. At all times relevant to this Complaint, JAMES REIFF, II was a citizen of the
22 State of Washington residing at 4440 193rd Avenue, Issaquah, Washington.

23 6. At all times relevant to this Complaint, NORTHWEST BIOMET, INC. was a
24 citizen of the State of Washington with its principal place of business at 13221 Southeast 26th
25

1 Street, Suite B, Bellevue, Washington.

2 7. At all times relevant to this Complaint, JAMES REIFF, II, individually and
3 operating through his company NORTHWEST BIOMET, INC., had an exclusive agreement
4 with the Biomet Defendants for educating orthopedic surgeons about available Biomet hip
5 replacement systems and the advantages, benefits, indications, templating, surgical
6 implantation, and follow-up of those Biomet hip replacement systems in the State of
7 Washington. Hereafter, these defendants will be referred to collectively as “Distributor.”

8 8. The information that Distributor provided about Biomet hip replacement systems
9 far exceeded the information provided on M2a packaging or labeling.

10 9. Distributor’s sales representatives selected the components and tools to have
11 present in the operating room when the Plaintiffs were surgically implanted with the M2a.

12 10. At all times relevant to this Complaint, Plaintiffs’ surgeons relied upon
13 information provided by Distributors’ sales representatives in selecting the M2a hip
14 replacement for implantation into the Plaintiffs’ bodies.

15 11. Distributor profited from the promotion, sale, and servicing of the M2a hip
16 replacements at issue in the instant case.

17 12. At all times relevant to this Complaint, Defendant JOHN CUCKLER, M.D. was
18 and is a citizen of the State of Florida.

19 13. At all times relevant to this Complaint, Defendant ALABAMA MEDICAL
20 CONSULTANTS, INC. was and is an Alabama corporation with its principal place of business
21 in Naples, Florida, and as such is a citizen of the State of Florida.

22 14. At all times relevant to this Complaint, Defendant JOHN CUCKLER, M.D.,
23 personally and through his company, ALABAMA MEDICAL CONSULTANTS, INC.,
24
25

1 received royalties and financially profited from his design, development, and promotion of the
2 M2a metal on metal hip replacement system. Hereafter, these defendants will be referred to,
3 collectively, as “Cuckler.”

4 15. Cuckler profited from the promotion, sale, and servicing of the M2a hip
5 replacements at issue in the instant case.

6 16. Cuckler, by and through his attorneys, consented to the jurisdiction of the courts
7 of the State of Washington.

8 17. Jurisdiction is proper in the courts of the State of Washington because the
9 Distributor defendants are both citizens of the State of Washington, Cuckler has consented to
10 be sued in the State of Washington, Cuckler directed his promotion of the M2a to surgeons and
11 patients in the State of Washington, and Plaintiffs were implanted with the M2a hip
12 replacement in the State of Washington.

13 18. Venue is proper in the Superior Court of Washington in and for King County in
14 that both the principal place of business and the residence of the Distributor defendants are in
15 King County.
16

17 19. Suit is brought on behalf of Plaintiffs for damages in excess of \$75,000.

18 **STATEMENT OF FACTS**

19 **A. The Biomet M2a is different than the typical hip replacement**

20 20. A hip replacement surgery replaces the natural head and socket of the hip joint
21 with artificial components.

22 21. The majority of hip replacements implanted world-wide over the past several
23 decades have utilized a replacement hip joint consisting of a metal head making contact with
24 an ultra-heavy-duty plastic cup inside a metal shell.
25

1 22. This typical hip replacement consisting of a metal-plastic interface has been
2 refined to the point that ultra-heavy-duty plastic hip replacements have a greater than 99.5
3 percent success rate per year.

4 23. The Biomet M2a instead uses a metal replacement head interfacing directly with
5 a metal shell; there is no plastic liner in the M2a. Accordingly, this type of hip system is
6 commonly referred to as a metal on metal hip replacement.

7
8 **B. Metal on metal hip replacements were tried decades ago and abandoned**

9 24. In the 1960s and early 1970s, hip replacement manufacturers first began to market
10 metal on metal hip replacements to surgeons.

11 25. Unfortunately, these early metal on metal hip replacements experienced a high
12 rate of heavy metal poisoning and failure.

13 26. When the metal shell and metal head of these implants rubbed together, they
14 released toxic cobalt and chromium debris into the body.

15 27. The cobalt and chromium debris resulted in patients suffering heavy metal
16 poisoning, causing tissue death.

17 28. As a result, the medical community abandoned metal on metal hip replacements
18 in the 1970s.

19
20 **C. Biomet and Cuckler revived abandoned metal on metal hip replacements with M2a**

21 29. Despite the prior failure of metal on metal hip replacements to perform as
22 intended, Biomet and Cuckler entered into an agreement to begin designing metal on metal hip
23 replacements in the 1990s.

24 30. As a result of this collaboration, the M2a hip replacement was created and began
25 being sold in the United States in 2001.

1 **D. Biomet and Cuckler employed loophole to avoid testing M2a**

2 31. Despite their knowledge that early metal on metal hip replacements were a failure
3 and resulted in heavy metal poisoning, Biomet and Cuckler conducted extremely limited
4 testing of the M2a before selling it for implantation into the bodies of patients.

5 32. To avoid comprehensive testing of the M2a hip replacement, Biomet and Cuckler
6 claimed to United States regulators that the M2a should be “grandfathered-in” because it was
7 substantially similar to hip replacements sold prior to May 28, 1976.¹

8 33. This loophole required no testing for safety or efficacy.
9

10 **E. Defendants claimed that the M2a was a “lifetime hip” and suitable for use in**
11 **younger, more active patients**

12 34. Defendants claimed that without the plastic liner to wear out, the Biomet M2a
13 should last a patient’s lifetime.

14 35. Defendants claimed that the Biomet M2a was suitable for implantation in
15 younger, more active patients.

16 36. Defendants promoted the M2a as a “lifetime hip.”

17 37. Defendants represented that the expected useful safe life of the M2a was well in
18 excess of 20 years.

19
20 **F. Biomet falsely claimed it conducted extensive testing of M2a**

21 38. Despite the fact that Biomet conducted no clinical testing of the M2a hip
22 replacement, it has continuously claimed “[t]he M2a-Magnum™ Large Metal Articulation
23 System offers optimal joint mechanic restoration and ultra low-wear rates in vivo” citing to a
24

25 ¹ See, https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/pdf4/K042037.pdf containing Biomet Manufacturing Corp.’s
510(k) Summary of Safety and Effectiveness (Last accessed May 1, 2019).

1 1996 article about previously abandoned types of metal on metal hip replacements.²

2 39. In a 2004 publication titled “Metal Ions – A Scientific Review,” Biomet falsely
3 concludes that: “Extensive research and years of clinical trials have failed to prove any cause
4 for concern associated with the ion levels exhibited from metal-on-metal implants.”³

5 40. In fact, in a heading on page 7 of the publication, Biomet goes so far as to claim
6 that: “Cobalt and Chromium may be beneficial to the body as established by research and listed
7 by the US government.”⁴

8 41. The 2004 publication by “Biomet Orthopedics, Inc., the Most Responsive
9 Company in Orthopedics,” is still available to orthopedic surgeons and the public online today
10 at <http://www.grossortho.com/images/stories/pdf/currenttopics/MetalIonWhitePaper.pdf>.
11 (Last accessed May 1, 2019).
12

13 **G. Cuckler conducted secret M2a marketing campaign in exchange for millions of**
14 **dollars**

15 42. In conjunction with the promotion of the M2a hip replacement, Cuckler gave
16 speeches and published articles such as “The Rationale for Metal-on-Metal Total Hip
17 Arthroplasty” published in 2005, claiming that there were “no adverse physiologic effects” to
18 metal on metal hip replacements.

19 43. At the time that Cuckler published the above article, Biomet was paying Cuckler
20 a percentage of the sale price of M2a metal on metal hip replacement systems sold in the United
21 States, something Cuckler failed to mention in the article promoting such hip replacements.

22 44. Pursuant to a Deferred Prosecution Agreement with the Department of Justice, in
23

24 ² See, <http://www.biomet.com/campaign/trueAlternativeBearings/BOI03400MagnumDesignRationale.pdf> (Last
accessed May 1, 2019).

25 ³ See <http://www.grossortho.com/images/stories/pdf/currenttopics/MetalIonWhitePaper.pdf>. (Last accessed May 1,
2019).

⁴ *Id.*

1 2008, Biomet made public that Cuckler received payments from Biomet of between \$3.0 and
2 \$3.1 million dollars in just the previous year. Extrapolating the one year that Biomet's
3 payments to Cuckler are publicly available, leads to the conclusion that Cuckler has received
4 tens of millions of dollars from Biomet.

5 **H. Thousands of M2a hip replacements are implanted in Washington citizens**

6
7 45. Defendants' promotion of the M2a hip replacement was extremely successful.

8 46. In Washington State alone, thousands of M2a metal on metal hip replacements
9 were sold by Defendants and surgically implanted into the bodies of patients.

10 47. These hip replacements implanted in Washington citizens were designed by
11 Cuckler and Biomet; promoted by Cuckler, Biomet, and Distributor; sold by Biomet and
12 Distributor; and implantation and follow-up instruction was provided to surgeons by Cuckler,
13 Biomet, and Distributor.

14
15 **I. Defendants continue to claim that the M2a is safe and successful**

16 48. Defendants sold M2a hip replacements for implantation into the bodies of patients
17 up to the year 2014 or 2015.

18 49. Defendants ceased selling Biomet M2a metal on metal hip replacement in 2014
19 or 2015.

20 50. However, Defendants have continued to reassure surgeons and the public that the
21 heavy metal poisoning seen with other metal on metal hip replacements is not an issue with
22 the M2a.

23 51. To this day, Defendants continue to claim to orthopedic surgeons and the public
24 that the M2a is a safe and successful product.
25

1 **J. In 2010 Johnson & Johnson voluntarily recalled almost identical hip replacement**

2 52. Approximately the same time as Defendants began selling the M2a, Johnson &
3 Johnson began selling the DePuy ASR.

4 53. The DePuy ASR was almost identical to the M2a in its primary design features.

5 54. Like the M2a, the DePuy ASR was a monoblock metal on metal hip replacement
6 system with its cobalt chromium alloy head articulating against its cobalt chromium alloy shell.

7 55. In the summer of 2010, in response to “higher than expected revision rates,”
8 Johnson & Johnson conducted a world-wide recall of the DePuy ASR hip replacement.

9 56. Johnson & Johnson advised surgeons to conduct detailed testing and follow-up
10 of patients with DePuy ASR hip replacements.

11 57. As a result of the testing and follow-up, dangerously high heavy metal levels were
12 discovered in a significant percentage of patients necessitating surgery to remove the metal on
13 metal hip replacements.

14 58. Heavy metal poisoning and tissue death from the toxic heavy metals released by
15 the ASR was widely reported in the medical literature.

16 59. The Defendants were aware of the reports and studies discussing the injuries
17 suffered by metal on metal patients as a result of this very similar product.
18

19 **K. Defendants’ response to the recall of the almost identical product: Sell more M2as!**

20 60. In response to the 2010 voluntary world-wide recall of an almost identical hip
21 replacement, Defendants did not:

- 22
- 23 a. Recall Defendants’ almost identical M2a hip replacement.
 - 24 b. Suspend sales of their almost identical hip replacement pending a full
25 investigation.
 - c. Conduct comprehensive testing of the M2a to ensure it was not prone to
causing heavy metal poisoning.
 - d. Warn surgeons of the design similarities and the need to inform and carefully

1 follow-up their patients.

2 61. Instead, Defendants increased promotion of M2a, attempting to capture market
3 share lost by Johnson & Johnson due to its voluntary recall.

4 62. Defendants devised marketing strategies to differentiate the M2a from the
5 recalled ASR hip replacement and other metal on metal hip replacements.

6 63. Defendants promoted these marketing strategies to surgeons and the public to
7 reassure them that the M2a did not cause heavy metal poisoning.

8
9 **L. In 2010, Netherlands hospital warns Biomet of high rate of pseudotumors with M2a**

10 64. At the same time that Defendants were reassuring orthopedic surgeons and the
11 public of the safety of the M2a, they were receiving reports of just the opposite.

12 65. Isala Klinieken (“Isala”) located in Zwolle, The Netherlands, has historically had
13 a long and close relationship with Biomet.

14 66. Isala was in fact a Biomet funded study site.

15 67. Prior to 2007, Isala implanted patients with Biomet M2a metal on metal hip
16 replacements.

17 68. In 2010, Isala reported to Biomet that when it performed CT scans of over 100
18 patients’ hips, more than a third had pseudotumors adjacent to the M2a hip replacement.

19
20 **M. Biomet warned that CT/MRI scanning was necessary to see tissue death from M2a**
21 **heavy metal poisoning**

22 69. Isala reported to Biomet that the necessity for revision surgery was not identified
23 until Isala conducted the CT scanning of their M2a patients.

24 70. Isala warned that by the time that swelling, pain, and clicking indicating tissue
25 death resulting from the heavy metal poisoning became apparent, the patient may have already

1 suffered extensive injury.

2 71. In 2010, Isala informed Biomet that it had ceased implanting Biomet M2a hip
3 replacements in its patients.

4 72. Isala encouraged Biomet to adopt a comprehensive screening protocol using CT
5 and MRIs of all patients with Biomet M2as implanted in their bodies and warned that without
6 such an enhanced protocol, patients may be at risk.

7 73. The Isala Klinieken reported some of its finding regarding the M2a in a British
8 medical journal.⁵

9 74. Despite all of these critical warnings provided by the Isala Klinieken, Defendants
10 failed to inform surgeons or patients in the State of Washington of the study, ignored the need
11 for follow-up screening, and instead continued to promote the M2a for implantation into the
12 bodies of patients.

13
14 **N. Finland University reports severe adverse reactions from M2a heavy metal debris**

15 75. Likewise, Turku University in Turku, Finland has historically had a long and
16 close relationship with Biomet.

17 76. Like Isala, Turku University was a Biomet funded study site.

18 77. From 2005 to 2012, the Biomet M2a metal on metal hip replacement was the
19 most commonly implanted hip replacement at Turku University.

20 78. In 2013, Turku University reported to Biomet that when the University examined
21 a sample of their patients implanted with the M2a, over half of the patients were experiencing
22 ARMD or “Adverse Reaction to Metal Debris” from the M2a.

23
24
25 ⁵ Bosker B, Ettema H, Boomsma M, et al. High incidence of pseudotumour formation after large-diameter metal-on-metal total hip replacement: a prospective cohort study. *J Bone Joint Surg Br.* 2012 Jun;94(6):755-61.

1 79. MRIs of the sample of Turku University M2a patients revealed that over half had
2 a psuedotumor or fluid collection in their hip.

3 80. Despite its long and close relationship with Biomet, in a 2013 publication of the
4 Nordic Orthopedic Federation, Turku University stated that “ARMD is common after ... M2a
5 total hip arthroplasty, and we discourage the use of this device.”⁶

6 81. Defendants failed to inform surgeons or patients in the State of Washington of
7 this study, that Turku University had discouraged use of the M2a, the need for surgeons to
8 screen their patients for Adverse Reaction to Metal Debris, and instead continued to promote
9 the M2a for implantation into the bodies of patients.

10 **O. Biomet used Olympic gymnast Mary Lou Retton as M2a spokesperson**

11 82. As part of the promotion of the M2a hip replacement, Biomet hired Olympic gold-
12 metal gymnast, Mary Lou Retton, as a spokesperson.

13 83. Mary Lou Retton had received a M2a hip replacement in the mid-2000’s.

14 84. Biomet heavily promoted to surgeons and the public that the M2a hip allowed
15 “younger, more active patients, like Mary Lou” to “return to her normal activities, including
16 her workout schedule.”⁷

17 85. Mary Lou Retton was used by Defendants to promote the M2a in brochures, in
18 newspapers, on radio and television, and in-person to orthopedic surgeons and the public.⁸

19 86. A heading on Biomet’s website proclaims “Mary Lou lives pain-free, and so
20 should you.”⁹

21
22
23 ⁶ Mokka J, Junnila M, Seppänen M, et al. Adverse reaction to metal debris after ReCap-MAGNUM-Magnum large-
diameter-head metal-on-metal total hip arthroplasty. *Acta Orthopaedica*. 2013;84(6):549-554.

24 ⁷ See, [http://www.biomet.com/fileLibrary/Patient_Education/PatientEdBrochures/Hip/English/Mary%20Lou%20Retton%
25 20-%20Magnum%20Magnum.pdf](http://www.biomet.com/fileLibrary/Patient_Education/PatientEdBrochures/Hip/English/Mary%20Lou%20Retton%20-%20Magnum%20Magnum.pdf) (Last accessed May 1, 2019).

⁸ See, <http://www.biomet.com/news/getFile.cfm?id=113&rt=inline&type=pr> (Last accessed May 1, 2019).

⁹ See,

1 **P. Mary Lou Retton has sued Biomet over defective M2a hip replacement**

2 87. Unfortunately, Mary Lou Retton, like the Plaintiffs in this action, is a M2a victim.

3 88. While initially “pain-free,” Mary Lou Retton suffered heavy metal poisoning
4 from the M2a hip replacement necessitating the surgical removal and replacement of the metal
5 on metal hip replacement.

6 89. Mary Lou Retton was so severely injured by the M2a metal on metal hip
7 replacement, that despite her status as a celebrity spokesperson for the product, she too has
8 sued the company.

9
10 **Q. Despite knowing of the failure of the M2a in Mary Lou Retton for years, Biomet continues to claim her a success story**

11 90. Biomet has failed to inform surgeons and the public that Mary Lou Retton
12 suffered heavy metal poisoning and had to have her M2a surgically removed.

13 91. Biomet continues to cite to Mary Lou Retton as a patient success story.

14 92. Biomet has known of the failure of Mary Lou Retton’s hip replacement for years,
15 but has continued to promote to surgeons and the public a false story.
16

17 **R. Australian government required Biomet to recall M2a**

18 93. Australia has a world-leading implant registry which keeps track of every
19 orthopedic hip replacement sold, implanted, and replaced in Australia.
20

21 94. Biomet ceased selling the M2a in Australia in 2011.

22 95. In 2014, the Australian government communicated to Biomet that it was seeing
23 excessive failure rates of the M2a in Australian patients.
24

25 http://www.biomet.com/fileLibrary/Patient_Education/PatientEdBrochures/Hip/English/Mary%20Lou%20Retton%20-%20Magnum%20Magnum.pdf (Last accessed May 1, 2019).

1 96. In 2015, the Australian government issued a “Hazard Alert” recalling the Biomet
2 M2a due to a “higher than expected revision rate.”

3 97. Because Biomet had already ceased selling the M2a in Australia, the Australian
4 government’s recall of the M2a consisted of the “Hazard Alert” and mandating Biomet notify
5 implanting surgeons in Australia of the recall and excessive revision rate.

6 98. Defendants have failed to disclose to orthopedic surgeons or the public in the
7 State of Washington that the M2a hip replacement was recalled in Australia and that the
8 Australian government issued a “Hazard Alert” regarding the M2a.

9
10 **S. Since 2012 Biomet has had false M2a failure rate data posted on its website**

11 99. From 2012 until today, Biomet had posted on its website under the heading
12 “Important information regarding metal-on-metal hips” data purporting to show the success of
13 Biomet’s metal on metal hip replacements at
14 [http://www.biomet.com/wps/portal/internet/Biomet/Healthcare-](http://www.biomet.com/wps/portal/internet/Biomet/Healthcare-Professionals/products/orthopedics/important-information-mom-hips)
15 [Professionals/products/orthopedics/important-information-mom-hips](http://www.biomet.com/wps/portal/internet/Biomet/Healthcare-Professionals/products/orthopedics/important-information-mom-hips) (Last accessed Dec. 13,
16 2018.).

17 100. The “Important information regarding metal-on-metal hips” is clearly intended to
18 reassure patients and surgeons that Biomet’s metal on metal hip replacements are safe and
19 performing as intended.

20 101. The “Important information regarding metal-on-metal hips” states “Biomet has been
21 closely monitoring the available data regarding its [metal on metal] hip devices.”

22 102. The “Important information regarding metal-on-metal hips” claims that there is no
23 statistically significant difference between survivorship of the Biomet Magnum and the Biomet
24

1 M2a-38 and hip replacements generally in the Australian National Joint Registry and the England
2 and Wales National Joint Registry.

3 103. By 2015, at the latest, Biomet was aware that the Biomet Magnum and M2a-38 were
4 failing at a statically significantly higher rate than hip replacements generally in the Australian
5 National Joint Registry.

6 104. Likewise, for years Biomet has been aware that the Magnum and M2a-38 were
7 failing at a significantly significant higher rate in the England and Wales National Joint Registry
8 than hip replacements generally.

9 105. Despite knowing that it would mislead orthopedic surgeons and the public
10 concerning the safety of its metal on metal hip replacements, Biomet has continued to promote
11 false information regarding the safety of its M2a hip replacement.

12
13 **T. M2a is a ticking time-bomb implanted in thousands of Washington's citizens' bodies**

14 106. The Biomet M2a is inherently defective.

15 107. When implanted in patients, it is prone to release toxic levels of cobalt and
16 chromium.

17 108. Patients thus can suffer heavy metal poisoning, resulting in elevated levels of
18 cobalt and chromium in the blood, pseudotumors, tissue necrosis, osteolysis, muscle wasting,
19 and other severe injuries.

20 109. The Defendants' failure to warn surgeons and patients that the M2a metal on
21 metal hip replacements that were surgically implanted in patients' bodies may be releasing
22 toxic heavy metals has left thousands of Washington patients with ticking time-bombs in their
23 hips.

24 110. Based on the studies discussed above and others, hundreds, if not thousands, of
25

1 Washington patients have already suffered undiagnosed pseudotumors, tissue death, bone
2 death, etc. as a result of poisoning from the toxic heavy metals released from the M2a.

3 **U. Washington State is facing a public health disaster from unmonitored M2as**

4 111. As a result of Defendants' failure to warn surgeons and patients of the necessity
5 for immediate testing and screening of implanted M2a hip replacements, the number of patients
6 poisoned and severely injured by the M2a will greatly increase.

7 112. The State of Washington is facing a public health disaster from unmonitored M2a
8 metal on metal hip replacements.

9
10 **V. Plaintiffs suffered heavy metal poisoning from M2a**

11 113. Each of the Plaintiffs to this action were implanted with the M2a hip replacement,
12 suffered heavy metal poisoning, tissue death, bone loss, and pain.

13 114. As a result of the heavy metal poisoning by the Biomet M2a, Plaintiffs had to
14 undergo an additional surgical procedure to surgically remove the defective hip replacement
15 and replace it with one with a heavy duty plastic liner.

16 115. Plaintiffs then each had to undergo an extensive recovery and rehabilitation.

17 116. As a result, Plaintiffs to this action lost their mobility, needlessly suffered severe
18 pain, was forced to undergo unnecessary revision surgeries, surgical trauma, and extensive
19 rehabilitation.
20

21
22 **W. Barbara Singer underwent a painful revision surgery for her failed left total hip**
23 **arthroplasty, and may require revision of her right total hip arthroplasty**

24 117. Ms. Singer was implanted with the M2a Magnum system into her right hip on
25 November 5, 2007, and into her left hip on January 30, 2008. She was in her early 60's at the
COMPLAINT - 17

1 time, and looked forward to continuing an active lifestyle.

2 118. Before her surgeries, Ms. Singer met with her surgeon, P. Brodie Wood, MD.
3 During the pre-surgical discussion, Dr. Wood recommended the M2a metal-on-metal bearing
4 technology, relying on Biomet's representations that the product featured superior longevity
5 and reduced wear. During the meeting, Dr. Wood indicated that the Biomet metal-on-metal
6 product was ideal for active, younger patients, because they would not wear out and she would
7 not need to undergo a second surgery later in life. As a result, they chose the Biomet product.

8 119. Ms. Singer was not aware that the Biomet product had not been clinically tested
9 for safety and efficacy by Biomet before being released to the market.

10 120. Ms. Singer was not informed about the surprising lack of clinical awareness
11 regarding the risks of metal ion wear presented by the Biomet metal-on-metal product.

12 121. Ms. Singer was not aware of the serious concerns raised by those responsible for
13 understanding the clinical safety of metal-on-metal bearings, including the unresolved
14 concerns raised by members of the August, 2001 FDA panel responsible for the pre-clinical
15 review of metal-on-metal hip products.

16 122. Ms. Singer was not aware that Biomet and Dr. Cuckler had entered into unethical
17 financial arrangements for the promotion of metal-on-metal hip implants, leading to criminal
18 charges and, eventually, Deferred Prosecution Agreements.

19 123. Ms. Singer was not aware of serious breakdowns in Biomet's adverse event
20 reporting systems, which were necessary to accurately track the safety and performance of the
21 Magnum product.

22 124. Dr. Wood implanted Ms. Singer's left and right Biomet hip products in excellent
23 positions, performing both surgeries at WSP Providence St. Peter Hospital, in Olympia,
24
25

1 Washington.

2 125. Despite Dr. Wood's excellent positioning of the M2a products, Ms. Singer later
3 developed problems associated with metallosis. In June, 2018, Dr. Wood arranged for blood
4 tests to check Ms. Singer's metal levels. The June 25, 2018 test report revealed unusually
5 high levels of both chromium and cobalt ions in Ms. Singer's blood.

6 126. As Ms. Singer could not discern which Biomet hip was more painful, she was
7 advised to elect which hip she preferred for revision. Ultimately, Ms. Singer was scheduled
8 for a revision surgery to remove and replace the failed M2a hip product on the left side.

9 127. On October 5, 2018, a follow up blood test revealed that the already high metal
10 ion levels in Ms. Singer's blood were increasing.

11 128. On December 10, 2018, Dr. Wood surgically removed and replaced the failed left
12 M2a hip product, in order to eradicate the high ion levels in her blood and address concerns
13 with metal-on-metal ion toxicity. Upon surgically opening Ms. Singer's hip area, Dr. Wood
14 observed significant metallosis around and on the tissues surrounding the Biomet product. A
15 pathology report confirmed the existence of numerous pigment-laden macrophages consistent
16 with metallosis.

17 129. Dr. Wood replaced the M2a head and added a ceramic component to the left hip
18 replacement, rendering the hip replacement no longer metal on metal.

19 130. Ms. Singer has undergone a long and painful recovery and rehabilitation from the
20 surgical revision of the failed left Biomet M2a hip implant, including a severe hematoma that
21 has complicated her recovery and her quality of life to this date.

22 131. Ms. Singer fears that an additional surgical revision will be required for the
23 Biomet M2a product that remains in her right hip. On March 18, 2019, Ms. Singer's post-
24
25

1 revision metal tests showed high levels of chromium and cobalt persisting in her blood. Ms.
2 Singer is scheduled for a follow up blood test to determine whether an additional revision is
3 warranted to address the persistence of high metal ions.

4 **X. Jason Lyons underwent two painful revision surgeries for his failed right and left**
5 **total hip arthroplasties**

6 132. Mr. Lyons was implanted with the M2a into his right hip on January 31, 2012,
7 and his left hip on May 8, 2012. Dr. James E. Clark, MD properly implanted both of the M2a
8 devices at Overlake Medical Center in Kirkland, Washington.

9 133. At time of the implants, Mr. Lyons was in his early 40's. Relying on the Biomet
10 representations about the "lifetime" M2a bearing system, Dr. Clark recommended the Biomet
11 M2a hip product to Mr. Lyons. He described the M2a Magnum as a product with a large metal-
12 on-metal bearing surface that was superior to other hip products, and for which metal ion
13 problems were not a significant concern. Dr. Clark assured Mr. Lyons that the M2a product
14 was designed to last a lifetime, making it well suited for younger and more active patients.
15

16 134. Prior to the surgeries, Biomet promoted its M2a hip replacements with Olympic
17 gymnastics champion Mary Lou Retton, who appeared before surgeons at Biomet sponsored
18 events, and appeared before the general public on televised advertisements throughout the
19 country. The advertisements promoted the Biomet M2a hip system as a life-changing and
20 superior product for younger and more active patients.
21

22 135. Before his surgeries, Jason Lyons saw the Mary Lou Retton advertisements and
23 was further reassured that the Biomet M2a product had a proven safe bearing surface that
24 would last a lifetime.

25 136. Mr. Lyons did not realize that the Biomet product had not been clinically tested

1 for safety and efficacy by Biomet before being released to the market.

2 137. Mr. Lyons was not informed about the surprising lack of clinical awareness
3 regarding the risks of metal ion wear presented by the Biomet metal-on-metal product.

4 138. Mr. Lyons was not aware of the serious concerns raised by those responsible for
5 understanding the clinical safety of metal-on-metal bearings, including the unresolved
6 concerns raised by members of the August, 2001 FDA panel responsible for the pre-clinical
7 review of metal-on-metal hip products.

8 139. Mr. Lyons was not aware that Biomet and Dr. Cuckler had entered into unethical
9 financial arrangements for the promotion of metal-on-metal hip implants, leading to criminal
10 charges and, eventually, Deferred Prosecution Agreements.

11 140. Mr. Lyons was not aware of serious breakdowns in Biomet's adverse event
12 reporting systems, which were necessary to accurately track the safety and performance of the
13 Magnum product.

14 141. Mr. Lyons' Biomet M2a hip product did not last a lifetime.

15 142. Within six years of implant, Mr. Lyons was suffering from disabling metal wear
16 damage to his body. Large painful masses developed near both Biomet implants. Fluid
17 aspirated from his left hip and an MRI indicated that Mr. Lyons had developed pseudotumors.
18

19 143. On October 19, 2018 Mr. Lyons underwent a left hip revision arthroplasty by Dr.
20 Benjamin Bengs at the Providence Saint John's Health Center in Santa Monica, California.
21 The surgery was necessary to address Mr. Lyons' failed left Biomet hip replacement product.

22 144. Upon surgically re-opening Mr. Lyons' left hip area, Dr. Bengs observed
23 significant pseudotumor fluid, which he then removed from Mr. Lyons' body.

24 145. During the procedure, Dr. Bengs replaced the left Biomet M2a head and cup, and
25

1 replaced them with polyethylene and metal components, rendering the hip replacement no
2 longer metal on metal.

3 146. On December 4, 2018 Mr. Lyons returned to Providence Saint John's Health
4 Center, and underwent a right hip revision arthroplasty by Dr. Bengs. As with the left side,
5 the surgery was necessary to address "metal-on-metal metallosis" arising from the failed
6 Biomet hip replacement product on Mr. Lyon's right side.

7 147. Upon surgically opening Mr. Lyons' right hip area, Dr. Bengs observed extensive
8 damage to the tissues surrounding the hip area. Dr. Bengs observed that Mr. Lyons' "posterior
9 capsule was for the most part no longer there." As with the left side, significant fluid
10 surrounded the joint area, and a developing pseudotumor was evidently "destroying the
11 posterior capsular structures" of Mr. Lyons left hip.

12 148. During the procedure, Dr. Bengs replaced the right Biomet M2a head and cup,
13 adding a ceramic head component, rendering the right hip replacement no longer metal on
14 metal.

15 149. The metallosis damage to Mr. Lyon's hip area is permanent and has caused
16 persistent and painful anterior dislocation of his right hip prosthesis.

17 150. Mr. Lyons has undergone long and painful recoveries and rehabilitation from the
18 surgical revisions of his failed Biomet M2a hip implants. He has suffered irreparable and
19 ongoing damage from the defective Biomet products.
20

21
22 **DAMAGES AND CAUSES OF ACTION**

23 151. As a direct and proximate result of the defective M2a hip replacement, Plaintiffs
24 suffered injuries, including but not limited to significant pain, tissue destruction, bone
25 destruction, metal wear, metal poisoning, loss of enjoyment of life, and limitation of daily

1 activities.

2 152. Plaintiffs expect to continue suffering such injuries in the future as a result of the
3 injuries received from the M2a.

4 153. As a direct and proximate result of the defective M2a, Plaintiffs incurred medical
5 expenses and expects to incur additional medical expenses in the future.

6 154. As a direct and proximate result of the defective M2a, Plaintiffs incurred lost
7 earning potential, income and earnings.

8 155. As a direct and proximate result of the defective M2a, Plaintiffs experienced
9 emotional trauma and distress and is likely to experience emotional trauma and distress in the
10 future.

11 156. Plaintiffs are not at fault for her own injuries rendering Defendants jointly liable
12 under Wash. Rev Code Section 4.22.070.

13
14 **COUNT ONE – ALL DEFENDANTS – FAILURE TO WARN**
15 **[Pursuant to Wash. Rev. Code Section 7.72.010(4)]**

16 157. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporates by reference the paragraphs above as if fully
17 stated herein.

18 158. At the time that Defendants designed, developed, promoted and manufactured the
19 M2a, such device contained defects that made it unreasonably dangerous beyond the
20 expectations of the ordinary consumer, and was unfit for its intended use.

21 159. The M2a reached Plaintiffs without substantial change in the condition in which
22 it was designed, developed, promoted, manufactured, and sold.

23 160. At the time and on the occasions in question, the M2a was being properly used
24 for the purpose for which it was intended, and such device was in fact defective, unsafe and
25 unreasonably dangerous.

1 161. The foreseeable risk of harm from the defects in the M2a could have been reduced
2 or avoided by providing adequate instructions or warnings.

3 162. Defendants had a continuing, post-sale duty to warn regarding the unreasonable
4 risk of harm associated with the M2a.

5 163. Defendants had sufficient notice about specific dangers associated with the M2a.

6 164. Defendants failed to provide adequate instructions or warnings regarding the
7 defects in the M2a which were known by Defendants or should have been known by
8 Defendants and could have been provided.

9 165. Defendants failed to exercise reasonable care to inform Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs'
10 doctors, and the medical community about dangers regarding the M2a that Defendants knew
11 or should have known before and after the M2a was sold.

12 166. As a direct and proximate result of the lack of reasonable and adequate
13 instructions or warnings regarding the defects in the M2a, Plaintiffs suffered the injuries
14 described above.

15
16 **COUNT TWO – ALL DEFENDANTS – DESIGN**
17 **AND MANUFACTURING DEFECT**
18 **[Pursuant to Wash. Rev. Code Section 7.72.010(4)]**

19 167. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporates by reference the paragraphs above as if fully
20 stated herein.

21 168. At the time that Defendants designed, developed, and promoted the M2a
22 implanted in Plaintiffs, and at the time the M2a was manufactured, the likelihood that the
23 product would cause Plaintiffs' harm or similar harms, and the seriousness of those harms,
24 outweighed the burden on Defendants to design a product that would have prevented those
25 harms and the adverse effect that an alternative design that was practical and feasible would

1 have on the usefulness of the product.

2 169. The M2as implanted in Plaintiffs contained a manufacturing defect in that it
3 differed from Defendant's design.

4 170. Defendants were aware that they were unable to adequately conform the
5 manufacturing process to the M2a's design.

6 171. The M2a was unreasonably dangerous beyond the expectations of the ordinary
7 consumer, and was unfit for its intended use.

8 172. The M2a reached Plaintiffs without substantial change in the condition in which
9 it was sold.

10 173. At the time and on the occasions in question, the M2a was being properly used
11 for the purpose for which it was intended, and such device was in fact defective, unsafe and
12 unreasonably dangerous.

13 174. A number of feasible alternative designs existed at the time Plaintiffs were
14 implanted with the M2a, including hip replacements utilizing ultra-heavy duty plastic.

15 175. As a direct and proximate result of the defects in the M2a, Plaintiffs suffered the
16 injuries as described above.

17
18 **COUNT THREE – ALL DEFENDANTS – BREACH OF WARRANTY**
19 **[Pursuant to Wash. Rev. Code Section 7.72.010(4)]**

20 176. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporates by reference the paragraphs above as if fully
21 stated herein.

22 177. Defendants expressly warranted that the M2a was reasonably fit for its intended
23 purpose as a hip replacement system. These warranties included, without limitation, the
24 allegations above as well as the following:

- 25 a. The M2a produced less wear than competing devices;

- 1 b. The M2a bearing surfaces were all carefully tested consistent with the Design
2 Rationale for the product;
3 c. The M2a was a clinically safe system;
4 d. The M2a was stronger and designed to last longer than competing devices;
5 e. The M2a did not exhibit high rates of revisions;
6 f. Fluid film lubrication would prevent contact of the ball and cup during
7 articulation;
8 g. The M2a was a safer alternative to metal on plastic hips using ultra-heavy
9 duty plastic liners.

10 178. Plaintiffs were reasonably foreseeable users of the M2a.

11 179. Defendant's warranties regarding the M2a related to material facts regarding the
12 safety and efficacy of the M2a.

13 180. Defendant's warranties were part of the basis of the bargain for Plaintiffs'
14 purchase of the M2a.

15 181. Defendants' warranties proved to be untrue.

16 182. As a direct and proximate result of the breach of the warranties regarding the
17 M2a, Plaintiffs suffered the injuries as described above.

18 **COUNT FOUR – ALL DEFENDANTS – INTENTIONAL MISREPRESENTATION**
19 **[Pursuant to Wash. Rev. Code Section 7.72.010(4)]**

20 183. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporates by reference the paragraphs above as if fully
21 stated herein.

22 184. As stated above, Defendants made misrepresentations of material facts about the
23 M2a or intentionally concealed information about the M2a from Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs'
24 orthopedic surgeons, and the medical community prior to and after Plaintiffs was implanted
25 with the M2a.

 185. Defendants possessed (and possess) superior knowledge about the level of
clinical testing and safety of the Biomet M2a system, including the lack of reliable support for
representations about the asserted clinical safety and failure rates of the M2a system.

1 186. The Plaintiffs and their surgeons are not able to discover Defendants' superior
2 and specialized knowledge and experience about Biomet M2a product complaints, failures and
3 revisions, and their systems for reporting and analyzing the same.

4 187. Defendants have failed in their duty to disclose known material facts to the
5 plaintiffs and/or plaintiffs' surgeons regarding the M2a, including but not limited to:

- 6 a. Biomet and Northwest Biomet's failure to properly report, analyze and track
7 M2a product failures and revision rates, as required for purposes of assessing
8 product safety;
- 9 b. Biomet's failure to conduct an interdepartmental review or health hazard
10 evaluation to confirm and warn consumers and the orthopedic community
11 about the root causes of adverse product events involving metallosis,
12 pseudotumors, and necrosis, even though clinics, studies and regulatory
13 bodies around the world were identifying the need to proactively address such
14 hazards;
- 15 c. Biomet's failure to test M2a bearing surfaces using the techniques Biomet
16 deemed necessary for product safety, as articulated in its own Design
17 Rationale;
- 18 d. Biomet's unethical and unlawful practice of paying millions of dollars in
19 royalties to prominent surgeons who were responsible for gaining acceptance
20 of the M2a products throughout the orthopedic community;
- 21 e. Biomet and Northwest Biomet's failure to alert surgeons to the problems of
22 and potential solutions for cold welding, which greatly increase the risk of
23 harm and damage to patients undergoing revisions of M2a products;
- 24 f. Biomet's abuse of the 510(k) process to clear the sale of the M2a without
25 FDA approval, by grandfathering the M2a based on older predicate devices
that had themselves failed because of metal wear related issues.

188. Additional misrepresentations and concealment included, but were not limited to:

- 19 a. Falsely representing the M2a had resolved the metal ion wear problems that
20 had plagued similar metal-on-metal hip products, including the predicate
21 systems on which it was based.
- 22 b. Falsely representing the M2a as reducing wear and providing higher function
23 for patients than other available hip systems.
- 24 c. Falsely representing the M2a metal-on-metal bearing system as a lifetime hip
25 product.
- 26 d. Falsely representing that the M2a is a safer and stronger alternative when
27 compared with other available hip systems.
- 28 e. Falsely representing that the M2a provided fluid film lubrication.
- 29 f. Failing to disclose the clinical significance and safety concerns regarding
heavy metal poisoning.

1 g. Failing to disclose patterns and trends of failure M2a implants.

2 189. For example, approximately six months before adopting the Magnum as his
3 preferred device, Olympia surgeon Dr. Peter Brodie Wood attended a dinner presentation on
4 the Magnum hosted by Biomet and Northwest Biomet representatives at a Tacoma,
5 Washington restaurant, believed to be El Gaucho.

6 190. Northwest Biomet executive James Reiff helped arrange the Tacoma
7 presentation, as well as other presentations of Biomet information on the Magnum to surgeons
8 throughout Washington.

9 191. The Tacoma presentation included a projected presentation of Biomet
10 representations about the superiority of the Magnum metal-on-metal bearing surface. In
11 addition, an east coast surgeon presented on his experience with the Magnum, and how his use
12 of the Magnum expanded to include virtually “all patients”, including the obese.

13 192. The Magnum was described as a “lifetime” hip with highly polished bearing
14 surfaces that were scientifically proven to have eliminated the risks of bearing wear. The
15 Northwest Biomet presentation indicated that the risks from wear, including metal ions, were
16 insignificant.

17 193. Northwest Biomet sales representative Keith Conklin helped coordinate the
18 presentation of Biomet’s information on the Magnum to surgeons throughout Washington,
19 including Dr. Wood. Pursuant to Biomet guidance, Northwest Biomet and Keith Conklin
20 continued to distribute Biomet representations about the Magnum to Washington surgeons,
21 including Dr. Wood. The information is reflected in the Magnum Design Rationale, product
22 brochures, and other alleged scientific and clinical information set forth in Biomet Field
23 Communications.
24
25

1 194. The information presented at the Tacoma dinner and within the Biomet
2 communications included false representations that the Magnum bearing system had resulted
3 in a “lifetime” hip, with “self-polishing” features that virtually eliminated wear problems when
4 compared to other devices, such as competing polyethylene products.

5 195. The information provided by Biomet, via Northwest Biomet, to Dr. Wood
6 included Biomet’s photograph of metal and plastic wear piles, with text explaining that the
7 Magnum metal-on-metal bearing was safer than competing products because it produced ultra
8 low-wear rates *in vivo*. Dr. Wood understood that Biomet followed careful practices necessary
9 for maintaining low wear and optimal clearance for each and every Magnum. Dr. Wood was
10 told that the Magnum was “self-polishing”, with ultra-low wear characteristics that actually
11 got better over time in the human body.

12 196. The misleading and incomplete information presented by Biomet, Northwest
13 Biomet, James Reiff and his sales representatives effectively convinced many orthopedic
14 surgeons in Washington to accept the Magnum in their practices, and convinced the Plaintiffs’
15 surgeons to recommend implantation of the Magnum in Plaintiffs’ bodies.

16 197. For example, the information convinced Dr. Wood to focus his orthopedic
17 practice on the Magnum. Within six months of the Tacoma meeting, Dr. Wood had made the
18 Biomet Magnum a preferred hip replacement product and, over the ensuing years, he became
19 one of the top utilizers of the Magnum in hip replacement surgeries in Washington, and the
20 nation. In turn, Dr. Wood’s sales representative Keith Conklin was recognized as the most
21 successful sales representative in the State of Washington.
22

23 198. In contrast to the reassuring representations about the Magnum’s safety and
24 efficacy, Biomet and its representatives (including Northwest Biomet, Reiff and Conklin)
25

1 failed to alert Dr. Wood and other Washington surgeons to many serious concerns and
2 unknowns with the clinical safety of Biomet's M2a systems, including a growing awareness
3 of problems with metal wear, metallosis, pseudotumors, cold welding, and the need for a head
4 removal tool to minimize patient harm during revisions.

5 199. Prior to implanting the Magnums, Plaintiffs' surgeons were not alerted to ongoing
6 concerns and uncertainties about the clinical performance of the M2a bearing system by those
7 who were studying the product; that the Magnum was being sold for implantation without the
8 level of clinical testing and review required for other medical devices subject to FDA approval;
9 that rather than an objective presentation of information, sales representatives were being
10 instructed not to raise or discuss ongoing concerns with metal ions when providing product
11 information to local surgeons; for surgeons raising questions about metal ions, sales
12 representatives were instructed to describe the problems as merely "theoretical" and to "change
13 the subject"; and Northwest Biomet and its sales representatives were recklessly failing to
14 fulfill its obligation to timely report the failure or revision of any M2a product to the proper
15 authorities, thereby impeding proper assessment of product failure rates.
16

17 200. The above representations and omissions were material and were made with the
18 intent to persuade and induce Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs' surgeons, and the medical community to
19 choose and to fail to properly follow-up regarding the M2a hip replacement system.

20 201. Defendants made the above representations or omissions knowing the
21 misrepresentations were false or were ignorant of the truth of the assertions.

22 202. The above representations and omissions are reflected in Biomet's system for
23 marketing the M2a product in Washington through its local distributor, Northwest Biomet,
24 Inc., and its executive James Reiff. Together, these defendants directed the aggressive
25

1 promotion of the M2a products to Washington's orthopedic community through a series of
2 written publications, brochures, and field communications which reflect the representations
3 and omissions detailed above. Through this marketing effort, Defendants established
4 acceptance of Biomet's representations about the M2a product's safety among surgeons in
5 Washington's orthopedic community.

6 203. Defendants made the above misrepresentations or omissions with the intention
7 and knowledge that their efforts would influence Washington surgeons and consumers in their
8 decisions to select the Biomet M2a hip replacement system for surgical implantation.

9 204. Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs' orthopedic surgeons relied upon and were induced to act
10 in reliance on Defendants' misrepresentations or omissions and in fact purchased the M2a
11 based on these misrepresentations or omissions.

12 205. As a direct and proximate result of the breach of the warranties regarding the
13 M2a, Plaintiffs suffered injuries as described above.

14
15 **COUNT FIVE – BIOMET AND CUCKLER DEFENDANTS – NEGLIGENCE**
16 **[Pursuant to Wash. Rev. Code Section 7.72.010(4)]**

17 206. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporates by reference the paragraphs above as if fully
18 stated herein.

19 207. Biomet and Cuckler designed, tested, distributed, manufactured, advertised, sold,
20 and marketed the M2a for implantation into consumers such as Plaintiffs by physicians and
21 surgeons.

22 208. Biomet and Cuckler were negligent and careless in the design, testing,
23 distribution, manufacture, advertising, sale and marketing of the M2a.

24 209. Biomet and Cuckler had a duty to perform adequate evaluation on the safety and
25 efficacy of the M2a. This included by reasonably gathering and reporting information

1 regarding complaints and revisions and conducting adequate analysis on the information
2 gathered.

3 210. Biomet and Cuckler further had a duty to share the results of its evaluation so that
4 Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs' orthopedic surgeons, and the orthopedic community could be adequately
5 apprised of the risks of the M2a.

6 211. Biomet and Cuckler failed to adequately evaluate the safety and efficacy of the
7 M2a.

8 212. Biomet and Cuckler failed to adequately share the results of its evaluations of the
9 M2a with Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs' orthopedic surgeons, or the orthopedic community.

10 213. Instead of acknowledging the uncertainties and dangers of the M2a system,
11 Biomet and Cuckler broadcast misrepresentations about the alleged safety and superiority of
12 M2a metal on metal bearing surfaces throughout the orthopedic community, and through local
13 distributors such as Northwest Biomet, knowing such information would be used to guide the
14 group of Washington surgeons and consumers who would be searching for artificial hip
15 replacement systems.
16

17 214. Biomet, Cuckler and Northwest Biomet supplied the false information about the
18 M2a system for the guidance of this group of surgeons and consumers, despite awareness that
19 they lacked the level of knowledge about M2a clinical safety that they professed to have.

20 215. The Plaintiffs and their surgeons justifiably relied upon the misrepresentations
21 and omissions about the M2a's clinical safety in their determination that the M2a was safe and
22 appropriate for implantation in Plaintiffs' bodies.

23 216. Biomet and Cuckler's failures to discharge their duties were a direct and
24 proximate cause of Plaintiffs' injuries as described above.
25

1 **COUNT SIX – DISTRIBUTOR DEFENDANTS – NEGLIGENCE**
2 **[Pursuant to Wash. Rev. Code Section 7.72.010(4)]**

3 217. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporates by reference the paragraphs above as if fully
4 stated herein.

5 218. Distributor marketed, advertised, sold, and distributed the M2a for implantation
6 into consumers such as Plaintiffs by surgeons.

7 219. Sales representatives working for Distributor were responsible for educating and
8 continuously guiding surgeons regarding the proper patient selection, surgical planning,
9 component selection, surgical technique, and post-surgery follow-up.

10 220. Surgeons, such as the Plaintiffs’ surgeons, reasonably relied upon Distributor to
11 properly perform these functions and Distributor had a duty to do so.

12 221. Distributor failed to properly perform these functions as described above and their
13 failure to discharge these duties were a direct and proximate cause of Plaintiffs’ injuries as
14 described above.

15 **COUNT SEVEN – ALL DEFENDANTS – UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES**
16 **[Pursuant to Wash. Rev. Code Section 19.86.010]**

17 222. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporates by reference the paragraphs above as if
18 fully stated herein.

19 223. The acts by Defendants in this cause of action include, but are not limited to, the
20 following deceptive and unfair acts:

- 21 a. Representing the M2a as a device clinically proven to be safe and effective.
22 b. Representing the M2a to be of a higher quality and more desirable product
23 than other available alternatives.
24 c. Failing to disclose adequate information about the safety and efficacy of the
25 M2a either before or after Plaintiffs’ purchase.
 d. Knowingly providing inadequate warnings about the M2a’s dangerous
 propensities.

1 224. Such acts occurred in the course of trade or commerce in the State of
2 Washington.

3 225. Such acts affected, and still affect, the public interest of all the citizens of the
4 State of Washington.

5 226. Such acts caused injury to Plaintiffs as described above.

6
7 **DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL**

8 227. Plaintiffs respectfully request that a jury be impaneled to hear this cause of action
9 and to award such damages as the jury finds to be fair and reasonable under the circumstances.

10 WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully demand judgment against Defendants for
11 compensatory damages and any other relief the Court deems just and proper.

12 DATED this 12th day of June, 2019.

13 ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS

14
15 

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